Abstract. Manipulation is a problem of fundamental importance in the context of voting in which the voters exercise their votes strategically instead of voting honestly to prevent selection of an alternative that is less preferred. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem shows that there is no strategy-proof voting rule that simultaneously satisfies certain combinations of desirable properties. Researchers have attempted to get around the impossibility results in several ways such as domain restriction and computational hardness of manipulation. However these approaches have been shown to have limitations. Since prevention of manipulation seems to be elusive, an interesting research direction therefore is detection of manipulation. Motivated by this, we initiate the study of detection of possible manipulators in an election. We formulate two pertinent computational problems -Coalitional Possible Manipulators (CPM) and Coalitional Possible Manipulators given Winner (CPMW), where a suspect group of voters is provided as input to compute whether they can be a potential coalition of possible manipulators. In the absence of any suspect group, we formulate two more computational problems namely Coalitional Possible Manipulators Search (CPMS), and Coalitional Possible Manipulators Search given Winner (CPMSW). We provide polynomial time algorithms for these problems, for several popular voting rules. For a few other voting rules, we show that these problems are in NP-complete. We observe that detecting manipulation maybe easy even when manipulation is hard, as seen for example, in the case of the Borda voting rule.
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On many occasions, agents need to agree upon a common decision although they have different preferences over the available alternatives. A natural approach used in these situations is voting. Some classic examples of the use of voting rules in the context of multiagent systems are in collaborative filtering [Pennock et al., 2000] , rank aggregation in web [Dwork et al., 2001] etc.
In a typical voting scenario, we have a set of m candidates and a set of n voters reporting their rankings of the candidates called their preferences or votes. A voting rule selects one candidate as the winner once all the voters provide their votes. A set of votes over a set of candidates along with a voting rule is called an election. A basic problem with voting rules is that the voters may vote strategically instead of voting honestly, leading to the selection of a candidate which is not the actual winner. We call a candidate actual winner if, it wins the election when every voter votes truthfully. This phenomenon of strategic voting is called manipulation in the context of voting. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite (G-S) theorem [Gibbard, 1973 , Satterthwaite, 1975 says that manipulation is unavoidable for any unanimous and non-dictatorial voting rule if we have at least three candidates. A voting rule is called unanimous if whenever any candidate is most preferred by all the voters, such a candidate is the winner. A voting rule is called non-dictatorial if there does not exist any voter whose most preferred candidate is always the winner irrespective of the votes of other voters. The problem of manipulation is particularly relevant for multiagent systems since agents have computational power to determine strategic votes. There have been several attempts to bypass the impossibility result of the G-S theorem.
Economists have proposed domain restriction as a way out of the impossibility implications of the G-S theorem. The G-S theorem assumes all possible preference profiles as the domain of voting rules. In a restricted domain, it has been shown that we can have voting rules that are not vulnerable to manipulation. A prominent restricted domain is the domain of single peaked preferences, in which the median voting rule provides a satisfactory solution [Mas-Collel et al., 1995] . To know more about other domain restrictions, we refer to [Gaertner, 2001 , Mas-Collel et al., 1995 . This approach of restricting the domain, however, suffers from the requirement that the social planner needs to know the domain of preference profiles of the voters, which is often impractical.
Related Work
Researchers in computational social choice theory have proposed invoking computational intractability of manipulation as a possible work around for the G-S theorem. Orlin, 1991, Bartholdi et al., 1989 ] first proposed the idea of using computational hardness as a barrier against manipulation. Bartholdi et al. defined and studied the computational problem called manipulation where a set of manipulators have to compute their votes that make their preferred candidate win the election. The manipulators know the votes of the truthful voters and the voting rule that will be used to compute the winner.
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Following this, a large body of research [Conitzer et al., 2007 , Davies et al., 2011 , Dey and Narahari, 2014 , Elkind and Erdélyi, 2012 , Elkind and Lipmaa, 2005 , Gaspers et al., 2013 , Obraztsova and Elkind, 2012 , Obraztsova et al., 2011 , Xia et al., 2010 , Zuckerman et al., 2011 shows that the manipulation problem is in NP-complete (NPC) for many voting rules. However, Procaccia et al. Rosenschein, 2006, 2007] showed average case easiness of manipulation assuming junta distribution over the voting profiles. Friedgut et al. [Friedgut et al., 2008] showed that any neutral voting rule which is sufficiently far from being dictatorial is manipulable with non-negligible probability at any uniformly random preference profile by a uniformly random preference. The above result holds for elections with three candidates only. A voting rule is called neutral if the names of the candidates are immaterial. Isaksson et al. [Isaksson et al., 2012] generalize the above result to any number of candidates. Walsh [Walsh, 2010] empirically shows ease of manipulating an STV (single transferable vote) election -one of the very few voting rules where manipulation even by one voter is in NPC [Bartholdi and Orlin, 1991] . In addition to the results mentioned above, there exist many other results in the literature that emphasize the weakness of considering computational complexity as a barrier [Conitzer and Sandholm, 2006 , Faliszewski and Procaccia, 2010 , Walsh, 2011 , Xia and Conitzer, 2008b . Hence, the barrier of computational hardness is ineffective against manipulation in many settings.
Motivation
In a situation where multiple attempts for prevention of manipulation fail to provide a fully satisfactory solution, detection of manipulation is a natural next step of research. There have been scenarios where establishing the occurrence of manipulation is straightforward, by observation or hindsight. For example, in sport, there have been occasions where the very structure of the rules of the game have encouraged teams to deliberately lose their matches. Observing such occurrences in, for example, football (the 1982 FIFA World Cup football match played between West Germany and Austria) and badminton (the quarter-final match between South Korea and China in the London 2012 Olympics), the relevant authorities have subsequently either changed the rules of the game (as with football) or disqualified the teams in question (as with the badminiton example). The importance of detecting manipulation lies in the potential for implementing corrective measures in the future. For reasons that will be evident soon, it is not easy to formally define the notion of manipulation detection. Assume that we have the votes from an election that has already happened. A voter is potentially a manipulator if there exists a preference ≻, different from the voter's reported preference, which is such that the voter had an "incentive to deviate" from the former. Specifically, suppose the candidate who wins with respect to this voter's reported preference is preferred (in ≻) over the candidate who wins with respect to ≻. In such a situation, ≻ could potentially be the voter's truthful preference, and the voter could be refraining from being truthful because
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an untruthful vote leads to a more favorable outcome with respect to ≻. Note that we do not (and indeed, cannot) conclusively suggest that a particular voter has manipulated an election. This is because the said voter can always claim that she voted truthfully; since her actual preference is only known to her, there is no way to prove or disprove such a claim. Therefore, we are inevitably limited to asking only whether or not a voter has possibly manipulated an election.
Despite this technical caveat, it is clear that efficient detection of manipulation, even if it is only possible manipulation, is potentially of interest in practice. We believe that, the information whether a certain group of voters have possibly manipulated an election or not would be very useful to social planners. For example, the organizers of an event, say London 2012 Olympics, maybe very interested to have this information. Also, in settings where data from many past elections (roughly over a fixed set of voters) is readily available, it is conceivable that possible manipulation could serve as suggestive evidence of real manipulation. Aggregate data about possible manipulations, although formally inconclusive, could serve as an important evidence of real manipulation. We remark that having a rich history is typically not a problem, particularly for AI related applications, since the data generated from an election is normally kept for future requirements (for instance, for data mining or learning). For example, several past affirmatives for possible manipulation is one possible way of formalizing the notion of erratic past behavior. Also, applications where benefit of doubt maybe important, for example, elections in judiciary systems, possible manipulation detection seems useful. Thus the computational problem of detecting possible manipulation is of definite interest in this setting.
Contributions
The novelty of this paper is in initiating research on detection of possible manipulators in elections. We formulate four pertinent computational problems in this context: Our specific findings are as follows.
-We show that all the four problems above, for scoring rules and the maximin voting rule, are in P when the coalition size is one [Theorem 1 and Theorem 4]. We observe that all the four problems are computationally easy for many voting rules that we study in this paper. This can be taken as a positive result. The results for the CPM and the CPMW problems are summarized in Table 1 .
PRELIMINARIES
Voting Rule CPM,c = 1 CPM CPMW,c = 1 CPMW Scoring Rules P ? P ? This paper is a significant extension of the conference version of this work Dey et al. [2015] : this extended version includes all the proofs.
Organization The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We describe the necessary preliminaries in Section 2; we formally define the computational problems in Section 3; we present the results in Section 4 and finally we conclude in Section 5.
Preliminaries
Let V = {v 1 , . . . , v n } be the set of all voters and C = {c 1 , . . . , c m } the set of all candidates. Each voter v i 's vote is a preference ≻ i over the candidates which is a linear order over C. For example, for two candidates a and b, a ≻ i b means that the voter v i prefers a to b. We will use a > i b to denote the fact that a ≻ i b, a = b. We denote the set of all linear orders over C by L(C). Hence, L(C) n denotes the set of all n-voters' preference profile (≻ 1 , · · · , ≻ n ). We denote the (n − 1)-voters' preference profile by (
We denote the set {1, 2, 3, . . . } by N + . The power set of C is denoted by 2 C , and ∅ denotes the empty set. A map r c :
C \ {∅} −→ C is called a tie breaking rule. Commonly used tie breaking rules are lexicographic tie breaking rules where ties are broken according to a predetermined preference ≻ t ∈ L(C). A voting rule is r = t • r c , where • denotes composition of mappings. Given an election E, we can construct a weighted graph G E called weighted majority graph from E. The set of vertices in G E is the set of candidates in E. For any two candidates x and y, the weight on the edge (
) is the number of voters who prefer x to y (respectively y to x). Some examples of common voting correspondences are as follows.
-Positional scoring rules:
we can naturally define a voting rule -a candidate gets score α i from a vote if it is placed at the i th position, and the score of a candidate is the sum of the scores it receives from all the votes. The winners are the candidates with maximum score. A scoring rule is called a strict scoring rule if
, we get the Borda voting rule. With α i = 1 ∀i ≤ k and 0 else, the voting rule we get is known as the k-approval voting rule. The plurality voting rule is the 1-approval voting rule and the veto voting rule is the (m − 1)-approval voting rule.
-Maximin: The maximin score of a candidate x is min y =x D(x, y). The winners are the candidates with maximum maximin score. -Bucklin: A candidate x's Bucklin score is the minimum number l such that at least half of the voters rank x in their top l positions. The winners are the candidates with lowest Bucklin score. This voting rule is also sometimes referred as the simplified Bucklin voting rule. -Single Transferable Vote: In Single Transferable Vote (STV), a candidate with least plurality score is dropped out of the election and its votes are transferred to the next preferred candidate. If two or more candidates receive least plurality score, then some predetermined tie breaking rule is used. The candidate that remains after (m − 1) rounds is the winner.
Problem Formulation
Consider an election that has already happened in which all the votes are known and thus the winner x ∈ C is also known. We call the candidate x the current winner of the election. The authority may suspect that the voters belonging to M ⊂ V have formed a coalition among themselves and manipulated the election by voting non-truthfully. The authority believes that other voters who do not belong to M , have voted truthfully. We denote the coalition size |M | by c.
Suppose the authority has auxiliary information, maybe from some other sources, which says that the actual winner should have been some candidate y ∈ C other than x. We call a candidate actual winner if it wins the election where all the voters vote truthfully. This means that the authority thinks that, had the voters in M voted truthfully, the candidate y would have been the winner. We remark that there are practical situations, for example, 1982 FIFA World cup or 2012 London Olympics, where the authority knows the actual winner. This situation is formalized below.
Definition 1. Let r be a voting rule, and (≻ i ) i∈V be a voting profile of a set V of n voters. Let x be the winning candidate with respect to r for this profile. For a candidate y = x, M ⊂ V is said to be a coalition of possible manipulators against y with respect to r if there exists a |M |-voters'
Using the notion of coalition of possible manipulators, we formulate a computational problem called Coalitional Possible Manipulators given Winner (CPMW) as follows.
Definition 2. (CPMW Problem)
Given a voting rule r, a preference profile (≻ i ) i∈V of a set of voters V over a set of candidates C, a subset of voters M ⊂ V, and a candidate y, determine if M is a coalition of possible manipulators against y with respect to r.
In the CPMW problem, the actual winner is given in the input. However, it may very well happen that the authority does not have any other information to guess the actual winner -the candidate who would have won the election had the voters in M voted truthfully. In this situation, the authority is interested in knowing whether there is a |M |-voter profile which along with the votes in V \ M makes some candidate y ∈ C the winner who is different from the current winner x ∈ C and all the preferences in the |M |-voters' profile prefer x to y. If such a |M |-voter profile exists for the subset of voters M , then we call M a coalition of possible manipulators and the corresponding computational problem is called Coalitional Possible Manipulators (CPM). These notions are formalized below.
Definition 3. Let r be a voting rule, and (≻ i ) i∈V be a voting profile of a set V of n voters. A subset of voters M ⊂ V is called a coalition of possible manipulators with respect to r if M is a coalition of possible manipulators against some candidate y with respect to r.
Definition 4. (CPM Problem)
Given a voting rule r, a preference profile (≻ i ) i∈V of a set of voters V over a set of candidates C, and a subset of voters M ⊂ V, determine if M is a coalition of possible manipulators with respect to r.
In both the CPMW and CPM problems, a subset of voters which the authority suspect to be a coalition of manipulators, is given in the input. However, there can be situations where there is no specific subset of voters to suspect. In those scenarios, it may still be useful to know, what are the possible coalition of manipulators of size less than some number k. Towards that end, we extend the CPMW and CPM problems to search for a coalition of potential possible manipulators and call them Coalitional Possible Manipulators Search given Winner (CPMSW) and Coalitional Possible Manipulators Search (CPMS) respective.
Definition 5. (CPMSW Problem)
Given a voting rule r, a preference profile (≻ i ) i∈V of a set of voters V over a set of candidates C, a candidate y, and an integer k, determine whether there exists any M ⊂ V with |M | ≤ k such that M is a coalition of possible manipulators against y.
Definition 6. (CPMS Problem)
Given a voting rule r, a preference profile (≻ i ) i∈V of a set of voters V over a set of candidates C, and an integer k, determine whether there exists any M ⊂ V with |M | ≤ k such that M is a coalition of possible manipulators.
Discussion
The CPMW problem may look very similar to the manipulation problem [Bartholdi et al., 1989 , Conitzer et al., 2007 -in both the problems a set of voters try to make a candidate winner. However, in the CPMW problem, the actual winner must be less preferred to the current winner. Although it may look like a subtle difference, it changes the nature and complexity theoretic behavior of the problem completely. For example, we show that all the four problems have an efficient algorithm for a large class of voting rules that includes the Borda voting rule for which the manipulation problem is in NPC, even when we have at least two manipulators [Betzler et al., 2011 , Davies et al., 2011 . Another important difference is that the manipulation problem, in contrast to the problems studied in this paper, does not take care of manipulators' preferences. We believe that there does not exist any formal reduction between the CPMW problem and the manipulation problem.
On the other hand, the CPMS problem is similar to the margin of victory problem defined by Xia [Xia, 2012] , where also we are looking for changing the current winner by changing at most some k number of votes, which in turn identical to the destructive bribery problem [Faliszewski et al., 2009] . Whereas, in the CPMS problem, the vote changes can occur in a restricted fashion. Here also, the margin of victory problem has the hereditary property which the CPMS problem does not possess. These two problems do not seem to have any obvious complexity theoretic implications. Now, we explore the connections among the four problems that we study here. Notice that, a polynomial time algorithm for the CPM and the CPMW problems gives us a polynomial time algorithm for the CPMS and the CPMSW problems for any maximum possible coalition size k = O(1). Also, observe that, a polynomial time algorithm for the CPMW (respectively CPMSW) problem implies a polynomial time algorithm for the CPM (respectively CPMS) problem. Hence, we have the following propositions. 
Results
In this section, we present our algorithmic results for the CPMW, CPM, CPMSW, and CPMS problems for various voting rules.
Scoring Rules
Below we have certain lemmas which form a crucial ingredient of our algorithms. To begin with, we define the notion of a manipulated preference. Let r be a scoring rule and ≻:= (≻ i , ≻ −i ) be a voting profile of n voters. Let ≻ 
The second line uses the fact that score
(a) and score ≻−i (b) < score ≻−i (a). The fourth line comes from the fact that x is the winner and the last line follows from the fact that the position of x is same in both profiles.
Similarly, we have the following argument for the score of a in the new profile (the second line below simply follows from the definition of scoring rules).
Since the tie breaking rule is according to some predefined fixed order ≻ t ∈ L(C) and the candidates tied with winner in (≻ , ≻ −i ), we have the following,
We now show that, if there is some (≻, i)-manipulated preference with respect to a scoring rule r, then there exists a (≻, i)-manipulated preference with a specific structure. 
We also have,
Since the tie breaking rule is according to some predefined order ≻ t ∈ L(C), we have the following,
Using Lemmas 1 and 2, we now present the results for the scoring rules.
Theorem 1. When c=1, the CPMW, CPM, CPMSW, and CPMS problems for scoring rules are in P.
Proof. From Proposition 1, it is enough to give a polynomial time algorithm for the CPMW problem. So consider the CPMW problem. We are given the actual winner y and we compute the current winner x with respect to r. Let ≻ [j] be a preference where x and y are in positions j and (j + 1) respectively, and the rest of the candidates are in nondecreasing order of the score that they receive from Theorem 2. For scoring rules with α 1 − α 2 ≤ α i − α i+1 , ∀i, the CPMW and the CPM problems are in P.
Proof. We provide a polynomial time algorithm for the CPMW problem in this setting. Let x be the current winner and y be the given actual winner. Let M be the given subset of voters. Let ((≻ i ) i∈M , (≻ j ) j∈V \M ) be the reported preference profile. Without loss of generality, we assume that x is the most preferred candidate in every ≻ i , i ∈ M . Let us define ≻ ′ i , i ∈ M, by moving y to the second position in the preference ≻ i . In the profile ((≻ ′ i ) i∈M , (≻ j ) j∈V \M ), the winner is either x or y since only y's score has increased. We claim that M is a coalition of possible manipulators with respect to y if and only if y is the winner in preference profile ((≻ ′ i ) i∈M , (≻ j ) j∈V \M ). This can be seen as follows. Suppose there exist preferences ≻ ′′ i , with x ≻ ′′ i y, i ∈ M, for which y wins in the profile ((≻ ′′ i ) i∈M , (≻ j ) j∈V \M ). Now without loss of generality, we can assume that y immediately follows x in all ≻ ′′ i , i ∈ M, and α 1 − α 2 ≤ α i − α i+1 , ∀i implies that we can also assume that x and y are in the first and second positions respectively in all ≻ ′′ i , i ∈ M . Now in both the profiles, ((≻
, the score of x and y are same. But in the first profile x wins and in the second profile y wins, which is a contradiction. ⊓ ⊔ Theorem 3. For scoring rules with α 1 − α 2 ≤ α i − α i+1 , ∀i, the CPMSW and the CPMS problems are in P.
Proof. From Proposition 2, it is enough to prove that CP M SW ∈ P. Let x be the current winner, y be the given actual winner and s(x) and s(y) be their current respective scores. For each vote v ∈ V, we compute a number ∆(v) = α 2 − α j − α 1 + α i , where x and y are receiving scores α i and α j respectively from the vote v. Now, we output yes iff there are k votes
, which can be checked easily by sorting the ∆(v)'s in nonincreasing order and checking the condition for the first k ∆(v)'s, where k is the maximum possible coalition size specified in the input. The proof of correctness follows by exactly in the same line of argument as the proof of Theorem 2.
⊓ ⊔ For the plurality voting rule, we can solve all the problems easily using max flow. Hence, from Theorem 2 and Theorem 3, we have the following result.
Corollary 1. The CPMW, CPM, CPMSW, and CPMS problems for the Borda and k-approval voting rules are in P.
Maximin Voting Rule
For the maximin voting rule, we show that all the four problems are in P, when we have a coalition size of one to check for.
Theorem 4. The CPMW, CPM, CPMSW, and CPMS problems for maximin voting rule are in P for coalition size c = 1 or maximum possible coalition size k = 1.
Proof. Given a n-voters' profile ≻∈ L(C) n and a voter v i , let the current winner be x := r(≻) and the given actual winner be y. We will construct ≻ ′ = (≻ ′ i , ≻ −i ), if it exists, such that r(≻) > ′ i r(≻ ′ ) = y, thus deciding whether v i is a possible manipulator or not. Now, the maximin score of x and y in the profile ≻ ′ can take one of values from the set {score ≻−i (x) ± 1} and {score ≻−i (y) ± 1}. The algorithm is as follows. We first guess the maximin score of x and y in the profile ≻ ′ . There are only four possible guesses. Suppose, we guessed that x's score will decrease by one and y's score will decrease by one assuming that this guess makes y win. Now notice that, without loss of generality, we can assume that y immediately follows x in the preference ≻ and B(y) be the sets of candidates with whom x and respectively y performs worst. Now since, x's score will decrease and y's score will decrease, we have the following constraint on ≻ ′ i . There must be a candidate each from B(y) and B(x) that will precede x. We do not know a-priori if there is one candidate that will serve as a witness for both B(x) and B(y), or if there separate witnesses. In the latter situation, we also do not know what order they appear in. Therefore we guess if there is a common candidate, and if not, we guess the relative ordering of the distinct candidates from B(x) and B(y). Now we place any candidate at the top position of ≻ ′ i if this action does not make y lose the election. If there are many choices, we prioritize in favor of candidates from B(x) and B(y) -in particular, we focus on the candidates common to B(x) and B(y) if we expect to have a common witness, otherwise, we favor a candidate from one of the sets according to the guess we start with. If still there are multiple choices, we pick arbitrarily. After that we move on to the next position, and do the same thing (except we stop prioritizing explicitly for B(x) and B(y) once we have at least one witness from each set). The other situations can be handled similarly with minor modifications. In this way, if it is able to get a complete preference, then it checks whether v i is a possible manipulator or not using this preference. If yes, then it returns YES. Otherwise, it tries other positions for x and y and other possible scores of x and y. After trying all possible guesses, if it cannot find the desired preference, then it outputs NO. Since there are only polynomial many possible guesses, this algorithm runs in a polynomial amount of time. The proof of correctness follows from the proof of Theorem 1 in [Bartholdi et al., 1989] . ⊓ ⊔ We now show that the CPMW problem for maximin voting rule is in NPC when we have c > 1. Towards that, we use the fact that the unweighted coalitional manipulation (UCM) problem for maximin voting rule is in NPC [Xia et al., 2009 ], when we have c > 1. The UCM problem is as follows.
Definition 7. (UCM Problem)
Given a voting rule r, a set of manipulators M ⊂ V, a profile of nonmanipulators' vote (≻ i ) i∈V\M , and a candidate z ∈ C, we are asked whether there exists a profile of manipulators' votes (≻
Assume that ties are broken in favor of z.
We define a restricted version of the UCM problem called R-UCM as follows.
Definition 8. (R-UCM Problem)
This problem is the same as the UCM problem with a given guarantee -let c := |M |. The candidate z loses pairwise election with every other candidate by 4c votes. For any two candidates a, b ∈ C, either a and b ties or one wins pairwise election against the other one by margin of either 2c + 2 or of 4c or of 8c. We denote the margin by which a candidate a defeats b, by d(a, b).
The R-UCM problem for maximin voting rule is in NPC [Xia et al., 2009 ], when we have c > 1. We will need the following lemma to manipulate the pairwise difference scores in the reduction. The lemma has been used before [McGarvey, 1953, Xia and Conitzer, 2008a] .
Lemma 3. For any function f : C × C −→ Z, such that
there exists a n voters' profile such that for all a, b ∈ C, a defeats b with a margin of f (a, b). Moreover,
Theorem 5. The CPMW problem for maximin voting rule is in NPC, for c > 1.
Proof. Clearly the CPMW problem for maximin voting rule is in NP. We provide a many-one reduction from the R-UCM problem for the maximin voting rule to it. Given a R-UCM problem instance, we define a CPMW problem instance
as follows.
The existence of such a V ′ is guaranteed from Lemma 3. Moreover, Lemma 3 also ensures that |V ′ | is O(mc). The votes of the voters in M is w ≻ . . . . Thus the current winner is w. The actual winner is defined to be z. The tie breaking rule is ≻ t = w ≻ z ≻ . . . , where z is the candidate whom the manipulators in M want to make winner in the R-UCM problem instance. Clearly this reduction takes polynomial amount of time. Now we show that, M is a coalition of possible manipulators iff z can be made a winner.
The if part is as follows. Let ≻ i , i ∈ M be the votes that make z win. We can assume that z is the most preferred candidate in all the preferences ≻ i , i ∈ M . Now consider the preferences for the voters in M is follows.
The score of every candidate in C is not more than z. The score of z is −3c. The score of w is −3c − 2 and the scores of d 1 , d 2 , and d 3 are less than −3c. Hence, M is a coalition of possible manipulators with the actual preferences ≻
The only if part is as follows. Suppose M is a coalition of possible manipulators with actual preferences ≻ ′ i , i ∈ M . Consider the preferences ≻ ′ i , i ∈ M , but restricted to the set C only. Call them ≻ i , i ∈ M . We claim that ≻ i , i ∈ M with the votes from V makes z win the election. If not then, there exists a candidate, say a ∈ C, whose score is strictly more than the score of z -this is so because the tie breaking rule is in favor of z. But this contradicts the fact that z wins the election when the voters in M vote ≻ ′ i , i ∈ M along with the votes from V ′ . ⊓ ⊔
Bucklin Voting Rule
In this subsection, we design polynomial time algorithms for both the CPMW and the CPM problem for the Bucklin voting rule. Again, we begin by showing that if there are profiles witnessing manipulation, then there exist profiles that do so with some additional structure, which will subsequently be exploited by our algorithm. 
Proof. From Definition 3, y's rank must be worse than x's rank in each ≻ ′ i . We now exchange the position of y with the candidate which immediately follows x in ≻ ′ i . This process does not decrease Bucklin score of any candidate except possibly y's, and x's score does not increase. Hence y will continue to win and thus ≻ ′ i satisfies the first condition. Now to begin with, we assume that ≻ Theorem 6. The CPMW problem and the CPM problems for Bucklin voting rule are in P. Therefore, by Proposition 1, the CPMSW and the CPMS problems are in P when the maximum coalition size k = O(1).
Proof. Proposition 1 says that it is enough to prove that the CPMW problem is in P. Let x be the current winner and y be the given actual winner. The proof of correctness is as follows. If the algorithm outputs that M is a coalition of possible manipulators, then it actually has constructed ≻ ′ i for all i ∈ M with respect to which they form a coalition of possible manipulators. On the other hand, if they form a coalition of possible manipulators, then Lemma 4 ensures that our algorithm explores all the sufficient positions of x and y in ≻ ′ i for all i ∈ M . Now if M is a possible coalition of manipulators, then the corresponding positions for x and y have also been searched. Our greedy algorithm must find it since permuting the candidates except x and z which are ranked above b(y) in ≻ ′ i cannot stop y to win the election since the Bucklin score of other candidates except y is at least b(y).
⊓ ⊔
STV Voting Rule
Next, we prove that the CPMW and the CPM problems for STV rule is in NPC.
To this end, we reduce from the Exact Cover by 3-Sets Problem (X3C), which is known to be in NPC [Garey and Johnson, 1979] . The X3C problem is as follows.
Definition 9. (X3C Problem) Given a set S of cardinality n and m subsets S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S m ⊂ S with |S i | = 3, ∀i = 1, . . . , m, does there exist an index set I ⊆ {1, . . . , m} with |I| = |S| 3 such that ∪ i∈I S i = S.
Theorem 7. The CPM problem for STV rule is in NPC.
Proof sketch: It is enough to show the theorem for the case c = 1. Clearly the problem is in NP. To show NP hardness, we show a many-one reduction from the X3C problem to it. The reduction is analogous to the reduction given in [Bartholdi and Orlin, 1991] . Hence, we give a proof sketch only. Given an X3C instance, we construct an election as follows. The unspecified positions can be filled in any arbitrary way. The candidate set is as follows. The tie breaking rule is ≻ t = · · · ≻ x. The vote of v is x ≻ · · · . We claim that v is a possible manipulator iff the X3C is a yes instance. Notice that, of the first 3m candidates to be eliminated, 2m of them are a 1 , . . . , a m and a 1 , . . . , a m . Also exactly one of b i and b i will be eliminated among the first 3m candidates to be eliminated because if one of b i , b i then the other's score exceeds 12m. We show that the winner is either x or y irrespective of the vote of one more candidate.
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